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.and Canada between January and March 2004 by Renee Grawitzky. The 
writer wishes to thank informants in both countries who gave of their time and 





1. Background and Objectives 
Like many other countries around the world, Canada has development 
numerous instruments to build political networks around the world. There are 
organs that exist to promote official foreign policy through the ministry of 
foreign affairs, embassies and organisations such as the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA). On another level, organisations 
such as the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) exist which 
they fund, but are seen to be independent of government. This independence, 
in theory, means some flexibility in terms of how the organisation operates in 
relation to office state organs. 
From its inception in 1970, the IDRC sought to support and 'develop the 
capacity of researchers in developing countries in key areas such as science 
and technology. The IDRC was established on the premise that the gap 
between 'rich and poor countries in research and technological capacity was a 
major hindrance to development'. By the 1980's the organisation began to 
fund projects to assist African and South American countries wishing to 
restructure their economies which were hampered by rising debt. 
Interventions included the establishment of economic research communities 
such as the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC). Other initiatives 
to support social scientists existing under dictatorships in South America 
became an important initiative. I 
i 
It is against this backdrop that the IDRC began to support the w~rk of anti-
apartheid researchers working for the democratic movement i.nside and 
outside South Africa (SA). Through such support it was able to! assist the 
African National Congress (ANC) to prepare for political transition which got 
underway with the start of negotiations around a political settlement which led 
to the first democratic elections in April 1994. Similarities exist between the 
IDRC's support for researchers in South America and South Africa. However, 
in the case of SA, the IDRC went further and for the first time (it would appear) 
supported the work of a political party which sought to overthrown the 
apartheid government. 
The decision to involve itself in SA appeared to be a bold move at that time. 
Until 1986, consistent with international sanctions (and the academic boycott), 
the IDRC had refused to get involved in funding research in SA which was still 
under the control of the apartheid state. This position was in line with the 
stance taken by the majority of international donor agencies. However, in a 
turn of events the IDRC's Board of Governors approved a new polic:;y towards 
SA which supported the process of political transition by working with the 
democratic movement in its efforts to undermine apartheid. In effect the ANC 
(in exile) and its allies inside SA became the client of the IDRC. What were 
the events leading to this decision which went contrary to international trends 
at the time? i 
I 
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It would appear, according to various informants that Dr Ivan Head, IDRC 
president at the time was tuned into the political climate and politica:1 signals in 
' I 
Canada at the time. A Canadian informant said Head's thinking around getting 
rid of the white government in SA dated back to the 1970's. In the intervening 
years, he tried to find a way of getting involved. Head's position was also 
consistent with that of the political leadership of the country who believed that 
the IDRC had the flexibility to get involved in SA as it was not an official 
government agency like CIDA. 'Prime Minister Brian Mulroney would be 
recognised for his consistent support for the movement against apartheid in 
SA whilst support for his domestic policies might however, be questionable', a 
Canadian informant said. Canada's position was viewed as a bold initiative 
which broke with the position of the conservative governments in place at the 
time in the UK and US. 
Head recalled the debates which raged on during the Board meeting. He 
believed there was merit in the request to support the anti-apartheid 
movement and that the Board should consider it seriously. Head recounted a 
discussion with President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania who shared his 
conviction that change was taking place in Southern Africa. The only question 
was how rapid and what nature. 'There was no question in my mind that 
change was happening and the wisdom of it. That being the case, it was 
essential to prepare black South African's for the day that they took 
responsibility.' Head said 'when the opportunity emerged for the IDRC to 
support the ANC, I felt it was our obligation to do so.' 
Aside from the prevailing political climate in Canada, it would appear that the 
ANC in exile made some sort of approach to the IDRC to assist it in research 
as -it began to plan and prepare itself for the time that it took over power in SA. 
By the mid 1980's the apartheid government was facing the full might of the 
anti-apartheid movement both externally and internally, resulting in the 
imposition of a state of emergency. This development saw the introduction of 
laws to restrict the ability of the anti-apartheid movement to mobilise. During 
this period formations inside the country such as Congress of SA Trade 
Unions (Cosatu) and those organisations, academics and activists opposed to 
the apartheid state began to conduct research in order to develop policy 
options for a post apartheid SA. A similar process was taking place within the 
ANC in exile. Dr Michael Sutcliffe, a former ANC activist (who later assisted 
the IDRC extensively) said that various leading ANC intellectuals and 
economists began meeting to chart a way forward. This was confirmed by 
former ANC research department Frene Ginwala (now speaker of the SA 
Parliament). Sutcliffe said the ANC was already, by the mid 1980's, receiving 
pressure from foreign governments to find out what its vision was for a post-
apartheid SA. Ginwala said from 1985 onwards the ANC set up teams around 
various policy initiatives. 
An informant said that whilst the Scandinavian countries were more open to 
supporting the ANC in exile, little real funding was available to research and 
understands an alternative agenda. Marc Van Ameringen, the former IDRC 
regional director in SA, in an article published in 1998 on the role of 
international donors supporting SA's transition remarked on this. He said 'up 
to the late 1980's the direct involvement of the international donor community 
in SA was limited.' 
The Boards' decision in 1986 provided the IDRC with its new mandate to 
formally contact the ANC in exile and its allies inside the country working 
within the broader liberation movement or as it was known then - the Mass 
Democratic Movement (MOM). Formal contact with the ANC was established 
through a series of meetings in Lusaka, Zambia with various representatives 
of the IDRC which might have included Pierre Sane, Van Ameringen and 
others. (Unfortunately, the IDRC participants could not be confirmed) 
This led to a period of intensive consultation between IDRC representatives 
and various formations both inside SA and within the region. Sutcliffe recalled 
how the initial contact' between Van Ameringen (and other IDRC officials) and 
the ANC was made internally. Sutcliffe facilitated a series of countrywide 
workshops between Van Ameringen and representatives of the full spectrum 
of political tendencies both inside and outside the MOM. These workshops 
and meetings were held to introduce the IDRC to the main political formations 
and discuss a range of issues including the academic boycott. In view of the 
dynamics around the boycott, the I DRC indicated that it could not be seen to 
be directly funding activities in SA. Sutcliffe recalled some of the intrigue 
around the funding arrangements and how funds were channelled into the 
country. 
Sutcliffe said this marked the start of IDRC funding of various research 
projects from about 1987 onwards and the co-sponsoring of workshops and 
conferences held inside and outside (mainly in Lusaka and Harare) SA which 
sought to assist the ANC and its allies in developing policies which would 
shape their vision of SA post apartheid. Some of these external meetings, 
which took place from 1988/89 onwards, were critical as they beg~n to tackle 
and kick-start debates around key areas of policy such as local government, 
housing, economic policy etc. One of these co-sponsored IDRC meetings 
which took place in Luasanne, Switzerland brought together, for the first time, 
ANC economists (living in exile), 'progressive' economists based in SA and 
traditional white economists working in the old government, its related 
institutions and the private sector to discuss future economic policy. 
The second phase of the IDRC's involvement in SA began with the decision to 
open an IDRC office in SA and the start of a series of important missions from 
1991 onwards. During this time Van Ameringen periodically visit the country 
while Sutcliffe was seen as the IDRC's unofficial internal person until Van 
Ameringen moved to the country in 1991. 
The decision to open an office in SA occurred some months following a visit to 
Canada by former President Nelson Mandela in 1990. By this time, the terrain 
in SA was changing dramatically and the ANC faced rising pressure to 
develop key policies and prepare itself for political negotiations. ·During his 
visit to Canada Mandela requested assistance from Mulroney in d~veloping a 
post-apartheid economic policy. In the words of Nelson Mandela: 'we 
recognise that without a sound economy none of our social aspirations can be 
met or sustained. This is a fundamental fact and the basis of our responsibility 
to fiscal discipline, to our government accepting the limitations qf what the 
economy can deliver at any particular time, and to a need for creating an 
environment that encourages rather that attempts to compel business and 
industry to develop and grow ... I asked then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney for 
assistance in helping the ANC to understand economic issues better and to 
develop its policymaking capacity in this regard.' The Canadian government 
tasked the IDRC with this responsibility. 
Cementing its presence in SA came about with the formal opening of an office 
in Johannesburg in 1992. The decision to open the office was motivated by Dr 
Keith Bezanson who took over as IDRC president in 1991. Bezanson said it 
was clear - following Mandela's release and the tensions and threats to 
stability in SA - that the IDRC could not purport to be serious about the 
programmes it supported without having a formal presence in SA 'The 
demand and complexity of issues was increasing. There was a genuine need 
for on the ground interchange, he believed.' 
Whilst a decision was taken to open the office there did not appear to be a 
uniform opinion in the IDRC Ottawa on how it should be managed and its 
status, except that its title seems to imply that it had regional office status -
IDRC-Regional Office for Southern Africa (ROSA). During Bezanson's 
presidency (which ended in 1997) Van Ameringen reported directly to him. A 
Canadian informant said there was division over whether the SA office should 
be a country specific operation or whether it should be a fully staffed regional 
office. 'SA represented a special case and was treated as such. Because it 
was treated differently it created tensions'. 
During its time in SA, until the office closure in 2001, the IDRC worked with 
various universities, independent research institutes and think-tanks, NGO's 
and broader civil society formations. The organisation supported over 40 
projects either aimed at research, technical assistance, training and capacity 
building to researchers, academics and broader communities in different fields. 
Whether it was a result of such support (rather difficult to determine), many of 
these people landed up in senior positions in government or over the years 
moved into senior government positions. 
It was however, during the early years (from the late 1980's) that the IDRC 
began to build its profile and credibility both within the ANC in exile and the 
individuals and organisations linked to the MOM inside SA Various informants 
stated that the IDRC was clear that its allegiance was to the ANC. Therefore, 
it was not necessary for discussion to take place on whether the organisation 
should be trusted or not. It funded initiatives and projects predominantly 
identified either by the ANC or its internal structures and it supported 
researchers and research aligned to the ANC and its allies. These 
interventions ensured that the IDRC was well-placed to assist the future 
political elite during transformation. 
The IDRC's involvement during SA's transition to democracy has been viewed 
by many in the organisation as one of its 'success stories'. This belief is based 
on a perception that it had 'influence', was effective and build capacity to 
make 'make good policy'. This report will seek to examine these issues (and 
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others) to determine what kind of role the IDRC played in the tral")sformation 
process. The report will seek to highlight: i 
);>- The nature of the contributions made by the IDRC through the 
programmes supported; i 
· );>- The role played by the IDRC in supporting policy relevant research and 
policymaking processes; · 
);>- The attitudes and views of South Africans towards the role played by 
the IDRC during the transition period; : 
);>- Lessons learnt and whether the SA experience can be 'used as a 
model to replicate in other countries in transition. 
2. Methodology 
This report is based on information gathered through a document review and 
interviews with key informants. 
Document review - The document review provided important background 
information to understand the main projects embarked upon by the IDRC. The 
bulk of the official documentation was obtained from the IDRC office in Ottawa 
while some documentation was also obtained from those personnel who had 
worked in the Johannesburg office prior to its closure in 2001. Some 
informants were also able to provide relevant documentation. (Annexure A for 
references) 
Interviews - These were conducted in both Ottawa, Canada during January 
2004 while a further series was conducted in South Africa between February 
and March 2004. In the main face-to-face interviews were conducted in both 
Canada and SA. However, there were instances when telephonic interviews 
were required in both instances. 
The majority of the interviews conducted in Ottawa were organised by IDRC 
itself. Those interviewed had either worked in the SA office at some point or 
another or had been involved in the key projects initiated by the IDRC in SA. 
The majority of people interviewed in Canada still work for the organisation. 
(annexure B) In the case of those interviewed in SA, the author of the report 
identified them and organised the interviews. An inordinate amount of time 
was spent trying to organise the interviews. As per the original eontract 30 
informants were officially interviewed while there were also numerous informal 
interviews and interviews via email for those senior government ministers, 
provincial premiers and officials who were unable to make themselves 
available because of the upcoming elections. The majority of the
1 
interviews 
took place in and around Johannesburg/Pretoria but some required a trip to 
Cape Town. Those interviewed in SA ranged from the Speaker of the 
Parliament to cabinet ministers, senior government officials, former ministers, 
representatives from NGO's, economists and researchers (annexure C). 
I 
The interviews did not follow a particular formal structure. The m~jority were 
semi-structured which allowed for an easy flow of information and! ensured a 
deeper analysis of the role played by the IDRC. The interviews pnoved to be 
very informative as the most appropriate people were targeted - th9se directly 
involved and not those who had peripheral information. The interviews ranged 
between 1 to 2 hours with, in some instances, follow-up telephonic 
conversations or via e-mail. 
It should be noted that it was rather unfortunate that Marc Van Ameringen, the 
former IDRC regional director, was unable to avail himself for an interview as 
it would have added immeasurably to the writers understanding and the final 
report. It was rather unfortunate that the IDRC was unable to facilitate such an 
interview. 
3. IDRC and key interventions 
From 1987 onwards the IDRC funded, co-funded and supported wide ranging 
initiatives which sought to either contribute to informed policy debates by 
either supporting research or building capacity to prepare the ANG for the 
time that it would ascend to power. The office did a lot research support 
projects in the late 1980's and early 1990's under the guise of developing 
projects but in reality Van Ameringen was supporting a number of critical 
people who were freed up from other work to focus on the research that 
needed to be done at that time. Whilst the report will briefly touch on some of 
the IDRC's earlier interventions in SA during the late 1980's, the main focus 
will only be on six key programmes which took place between 1991 and 
1996/7. The focus on these programmes should not however, in any way be 
seen to downplay the contribution of the myriad of other programmes and 
projects supported and initiated such as peace building and reconstruction, 
agriculture and land reform, small, medium and micro-enterprise development 
and health. The focus on the six programmes is intended to provide a clear 
understanding of the IDRC's role in SA during the transition period. The 
following programmes were selected as they constituted some of the most 
important work done by the IDRC during its time in SA: 
• Economic, trade and industrial policy 
• Urban development and local government 
• Science and technology 
• Environment and natural resource management 
• Supporting democracy: governance programme 
• Information and Communications Policies and Technologies 
The majority of these programmes were initiated prior to the first democratic 
elections in 1994. However, after 1994 the new government requested the 
IDRC to assist in the processes leading up to the development of a new 
telecommunications and environmental policy. 
3.1 Economic, trade and industrial policy 
Mandela formally approached the Canadian government for assistance in 
building capacity within the ANG and democratic movement to undertake 
economic research, analysis and policy formulation in 1990. However, the 
IDRC, as mentioned previously, was already funding various aspects of 
economic research from 1987 onwards. However, as stated in the first in the 
,, 
.J 
four part series on 'Building a New SA', many of these initiative:; were not 
sufficiently co-ordinated. A group of intellectuals within the ANC in exile began 
to do some policy work in 1984/5 whilst a similar process was going on in SA 
by economists and researchers sympathetic to the ANC. Some of these 
economists and academics operated within the Economic Trends Group 
' I 
{ETG). The ETG was set up with funding from Canada and sought to provide 
economic policy advice to Cosatu. It was however, only in ~nd around 
1988/89 that broader consultation began within the MOM with various 
meetings between four groups who had never interacted before: ' 
• Economists aligned to the MOM such as ETG; . 
• Economists who formed part of the ANC's economics department in 
Lusaka; 
• Economists linked to the London-based ANC group; and 
• Traditional white economists aligned either with the old government 
and its institutions such as the SA Reserve Bank or private sector. 
These groups came together in an important meeting in Lausanne, 
Switzerland in 1989 to engage in discussions on economic policy. This 
constituted the first official meeting between elements of the old government 
and the ANC. A SA-based economist, who did work for Cosatu, said it was 
the first time 'we had met people (other economists) from government. We 
had no contact with them'. Another informant said that one might have 
expected vast differences between the old white established economists and 
the ANC for example. However, this was not so evident. The Lausanne 
meeting led to a series of research projects and closer working ties between 
the ANC in exile and progressive SA-based economists. A series of meetings, 
co-sponsored by the IDRC,. was held in Harare in 1990 between these two 
groupings as part of an attempt to co-ordinate initiatives. While these 
meetings were underway a number of ANC people started coming back into 
the country and helped set up the ANC's economics department with the help 
of Max Sisulu and Tito Mboweni (now SA Reserve Bank governor). These 
meetings were aimed at emerging with an ANC position arounq economic 
policy. 
In a separate development the idea of setting up the Industrial Strategy 
Project (ISP) was borne with assistance from the IDRC. An approach was 
made to the ETG to persuade them to become involved in the ISP .. The IDRC 
was central to the funding of the initial conceptualisation of the project. The 
ISP was seen to be a critical intervention as it funded research which sought 
to address SA's future challenges such as future industrial and trade policies 
and position around the WTO. 
Despite the various initiatives underway no overall economic framework had 
been developed by the time Mandela approached the Canadian government 
in 1990. The IDRC was appointed by the Canadian government to carry out 
Mandela's request and launched an economic mission in 1991 he~ded up by 
Canadian economist Gerry Helleiner. · ! 
' 
The results of the mission are well documented. It sought not only to evaluate 
existing capacity amongst the 'anti-apartheid economics community' to 
develop policy but also to identify areas of research around economic policy 
and suggest ways of responding to the required needs. The missions' 
recommendations included, amongst others, the following: 
o Restructuring the ANC's economics department so that the 
organisation could prepare its economic capabilities for governing; 
o The setting up of the Macro-Economic Research Group (Merg) to 
stimulate and coordinate policy research and training in a range of 
areas such as developing a macro-economic framework; 
o Investigating the setting up of an institute for economic policy research 
and training. This led to the transformation of Merg into the National 
Institute of Economic Policy (Niep); 
o Proposals to build capacity in unions and other service organisations 
as well as mechanisms to facilitate an exchange of information 
between business and government to assist the democratic movement 
in formulating economic policy; "" 
o Various mechanisms to free up the capacity of researchers and 
economists to develop economic policy 
o Build capacity amongst black economists and researchers 
Reflections 
It has generally been agreed that the economic mission was an important 
contribution to the policymaking process as it: 
• facilitated closer working relations between those economists who had 
been in exile and those based in SA; 
• motivated the ANC and its allies to start thinking about economic 
issues in more practical terms; 
• led to a recognition that a proper assessment of the state of the 
economy and existing resources and capacity was necessary in order 
to develop policy; 
• Identified areas for further research; 
• Brought onto the ta,ble methodology of doing research and capacity 
building amongst black researchers and doingresearch 
• Facilitated the building of linkages between South Africans and other 
IDRC institutions such as the AECR, a network of African economistS 
which was viewed to be extremely useful and added an important 
dimension to the process. A number of informants stated this was a 
very important as these economists had the 'African experience', they 
knew what had and had not worked in Africa; 
• Facilitated and supported a more open debate around policy as the 
IDRC brought in a range of people and organisations into the process; 
• Endorsed the establishment of institutions such as Niep and facilitated 
the development of the Trade and Industrial Policy Secretariat (TIPS). 
The IDRC had good intentions of replication the AECR in SA in the 
form of Niep but it has not had the desired effect. The situation is· 
different in the case of Tips (elaborated on below); 
• Facilitated a range of processes which together contributed towards 
the building of intellectual capital in the country. Alan Hirsch, now in 
the presidency, said the IDRC's significance lay in it assisting in the 
building of an 'economic policy intelligentsia'. Other informants agreed 
that the IDRC (Van Ameringen) was very effective at being able to 
identify intellectuals who could deliver and had the 'right' c;;redentials. 
Not only did the IDRC select the right people but also suppprted, what 
informants believed were 'right' projects and were sensitive to the 
dynamics at play. Numerous informants were clear that the IDRC did 
not try to impose or control the South African's. 'We had enough 
suspicions about people wanting to control us'; and I 
• The IDRC assisted the ANC in harnessing resources ·within the 
research community to expand its own policy capacities. 
Despite the immediate success of the economic mission - as it galvanised 
people and especially the ANC and its allies to 'get moving' ori economic 
policy - informants agreed it was questionable to what extent the new 
government took on board the missions report and recommendations. There 
is ho·wever, an acknowledgement that the various processes supported by the 
IDRC from the late 1980's to Merg and beyond all contributed to a deeper and 
more informed debate. The IDRC contribution, a key informant said, was 
more in accelerating a required process rather than any specific policy 
conclusion. The IDRC impacted on process, building capacity and allowing 
key people to act more quickly than they otherwise would have. 
As Sisulu said final economic policy emerged from a range of processes not 
just those funded by the IDRC. The resultant macro-economic policy adopted 
by the new government post 1994 was not related to the direct work of the 
mission. In the end, the new government went its own way and found its own 
sources for advice. There might well be an argument that this occurred 
because Merg failed to deliver a macro-economic framework which was 
acceptable to the majority in the ANC. 
3.1.1 Merg 
One of the key recommendations of the economic mission was 'to stimulate 
and coordinate policy research and training in a range of areas such as 
developing a macro-economic framework.' The Merg process could well be 
the subject of a book. Unfortunately, for these purposes it will be briefly 
touched on as it did in a perverse way refine economic thinking. 
An informant said it was unfortunate that the Merg process not only became 
highly personalised but led to major divisions, backstabbing and infighting that 
in the end the IDRC withdrew its support. In the SA media the Merg process 
was depicted as a battle between the left and the right within the ANC. As in 
most cases, events and developments are more nuanced. The :one group 
claimed it wanted to develop a 'progressive' agenda whilst the other group 
pushed for a 'left' agenda. One observer said: 'there was a sense of being 
recolonized by old style leftists while the SA economists appe~red to be 
closer to the ANC position'. The Merg process highlighted the different views 
around economic policy. The Canadians got tired of the infighting and 
backstabbing, an informant said. ANC initial support turned to disillusionment 
with the process. At the same time, however, the ANC began engaging with 
other foreign groups. Merg failed to become credible left alternative which the 
new government could implement. Merg 'blew up', one informant said, 
because it had no direction. Others argued that Merg became embroiled in 
tensions 'around ownership of the policy' as some argued that it became 
dominated by foreigners. The question, which has not really been explored, is 
whether the 'foreigner' issue was raised because that grouping was 
supporting a left position which the ANC was not comfortable with. Moss 
Ngosheng, formerly in government, said the ANC London group exerted a big 
influence over the process. 'There was a view that they were stuck in a certain 
ideological position. If they had won the debate there would have been a more 
radically left document than the RDP which was driven more by ANC 
technocrats.' However, a lot of elements of Merg found their way into the 
RDP. 
· Whatever the problems around the Merg report, some would argue that it did 
help to build capacity amongst a group of black researchers (although the 
capacity building element did suffer and was not as large as initially 
anticipated). UK-based economist Professor Ben Fine felt there were 
problems around the commitment of some predominantly white academics to 
training and capacity building of black researchers. As part of the economic 
mission's recommendations, .the IDRC and other funders assisted in 
transforming Merg into Niep. However, by that stage the power holders in the 
ANC no longer saw Merg as being credible and hence its so-called successor. 
Niep was supposed to be modelled on the AECR but, in the eyes of many, it 
has failed to fulfil its vision (unable to attract good economistsO which included 
a more structured relationship between itself and government. Niep's change 
in status, some might argue, could partly reflect a shift in the dynamics within 
the ANC as to who now influences policy. There might well be an argument 
that Merg fell fowl to a similar process. SA's finance minister Trevor Manuel 
was initially involved in the governance of Merg and when he became finance 
minister expectations were high that he would utilise it, as history has shown 
this did not occur. 
Fine said 'the history of Merg is dominated by reports on the production of the 
final report. This is misleading as Merg was set up primarily as a funding 
organisation to undertake economic research and build capacity amongst 
black economists and focus on policy. Merg's focus shifted when a high level 
urgent request came in 1993 (from Mandela) to produce an alternative 
economic policy. I was opposed to doing this as it appeared to undermine 
Merg's original objective_ to build capacity.' He said by the time the report was 
released it was disowned by the ANC as positions had changed. 
Aside from the many political and personal problems which besieged Merg, a 
number of informants complained of poor administration and coordination. 
There was also some talk of financial irregularities and the possibility of an 
IDRC forensic investigation. 
3. 1. 2 Industrial policy and trade 
Aside from Merg, the IDRC was involved in supporting a range of other 
initiatives which sought to facilitate and support the development: of policies 
critical to the overall stability and growth of the SA economy. These related to 
support for the building capacity around formulating policy aroun9 industrial 
strategy and trade related matters. This saw support for the launching of the 
Industrial Strategy Project (ISP) and the establishment of TIPS. One 
Canadian informant said: 'the economic mission and subsequent projects 
have been viewed by some Canadians as a success partly beca~se it led to 
the establishment of TIPS.' · 
The ISP occurred in the late 1980's and appeared to be more successful 
(than Merg) in terms of its influence on policy especially in the case of trade 
and industrial policy. Informants cautioned however, that the impact of ISP on 
policy could partly be attributed to the fact that the vast majority of those 
researchers and economists who were involved in the ISP either went into 
senior government positions or became consultants to government. 
Various independent assessments have been conducted on the role of TIPS. 
The most recent evaluation for the IDRC was conducted in 2001 (at the time 
of the closure of the SA office) whilst it is understood that other key funders 
have also conducted their own evalutions. TIPS was established following a 
request from the dti (it is small letters as part of the departments branding) to 
the IDRC. It was set up the IDRC to produce research which would assist the 
dti in its policy making capacity. Over the years it has contributed extensively 
to the working of the dti and in building capacity amongst researchers 
engaged in work around trade and industrial policy. Hirsch said· the rationale 
of TIPS was to build up the policy capacity outside of government as a 
vacuum was created when researchers and intellectuals .went into 
government post 1994. 
Former dti special advisor (and researcher in ISP) Zav Rastomjee concurred 
with Hirsch that Tl PS, to some degree, filled the gap for those intellectuals 
who moved· into government. Tl PS was set up to be independent from 
government (eventhough initial thinking was that it should be housed in the dti) 
but at the same time ensure close ties with the dti. A number of informants 
stated that the relationship between TIPS and the dti is different from the early 
years. In recent years, it has become more critical of government policy whilst 
there is a perception that the dti is not as receptive to using intellectuals as it 
was in the past. 
There is however, general acknowledgement that TIPS has been ~uccessful, 
not necessarily in developing policy but it has created the environment to 
influence government thinking. As former TIPS director Rashad Cassim said 
TIPS might not have influenced government in its decision to enter into trade 
negotiations with the EU. But once that was done, TIPS assisted in 
developing positions around key areas under discussion. Organisations such 
as TIPS remains effective, one informant said, where there is ~ supply of 
researchers (which did not occur in the case of Niep) and receptive policy 
makers exist. · 
I 
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3.2 Urban development and local government 
A critical area of work which the ANC identified in the mid 1980's was 
research around the future of local governments, the delivery of basic 
services and the state of both the urban and rural areas. As the mission report 
on 'Cities in Transition: Towards an Urban Policy for a Democratic SA' stated: 
There is no question that a major challenge for the democratic movement in 
SA will be to reverse the trend towards poverty and political marginalisation 
for an increasingly urbanised population'. The start of the political negotiations 
quickly revealed that change 'is likely to be very difficult to achieve'. Within 
that context it was acknowledged that SA had entered into a period of 'urban 
crisis' as the ANC faced the task of trying to redress the effects of an 
'apartheid-based pattern of urban development in order to achieve a system 
which is non-racial, democratic, efficient, integrated and sustainable.' 
An approach was made by the ANC to the IDRC to assist in developing a 
framework for a national urban policy. Key to this was developing a process 
whereby the ANC (and its allies) could strengthen their capacity in developing 
and implementing an urban policy but at the same time assist in the 
constitutional negotiations. (Initially local government did not form part of the 
constitutional negotiations taking place at the World Trade Centre. A separate 
negotiating forum for local government was taking place. However, it became 
apparent that the state of local government was critical to what was taking 
place in the broader political negotiations as the point of implementation 
would be at local government level. Ultimately, implementation could only 
occur if stable local authorities existed. It was only then that local government 
was brought into the broader political negotiations). 
The mission therefore,. sought to identify key areas of research for the drafting 
of an urban policy and to develop a process to strengthen institutional 
capacity to achieve this. The mission conducted its initial work in April 1992 
and released its final report in September of that year. It recommended the 
adoption of an urban development approach (which sought . to expand 
opportunities to those previously excluded from the benefits of urbanisation). 
The mission stressed the need to . reintegrate cities which were previously 
separated because of apartheid. This proposal had serious and far-reaching 
consequences for the future of municipalities and local authorities. The 
mission also believed there was a need to involve broader civil society in such 
initiatives. The missions' recommendations also highlighted the need for 
greater co-ordination between the ANC departments of local government and 
economic policy. 
Various recommendations focused on the building of capacity both inside the 
ANC's department for local government and amongst its key allies and 
service organisations operating in the urban sector. The mission also noted 
the absence of proper. training programmes in the area of local government 
administration and issues around appropriate research aimed to build a 'post-
apartheid urban environment'. In order to address needs around broad 
capacity building the mission recommended the establishment of a National 
Urban Institute (NUI) to co-ordinate urban policy research and training. One of 
This assistance resulted in the IDRC's research team eventually moving into 
the institutions (government) and facilitated the implementation of policy 
positions. Some might argue that the IDRC could have opted for a different 
strategy and instead assisted in developing internal capacity. Presumably the 
demands of the day prevented this option from being considered. At some 
point the IDRC should have begun to shift focus to capacity building. However, 
as mentioned, the pace of development meant that the IDRC's ability to focus 
on its traditional role of technical assistance, mentoring and , long term 
capacity building was compromised to comply with the new governments 
demand to support policy reform. This raises some interesting questions 
about the long term implications of engaging directly with governments? 
Despite these concerns, the mission and the IDRC achieved the following: 
• Ensured a thorough and more inclusive process which promoted 
dialogue with the 'old guard' and allowed people to explore different 
positions; 
• The process not only attempted to include various stakeholders but 
included a range of other donors; 
• gave respectability to more radical thinking than would otherwise have 
been contemplated; 
• for the first time the SA science community was measured not in terms 
of its military success but forced to engage in a process of self-
introspection which led to a review of key institutions; ' 
• the external review by consultants (as part of the mission) opened the 
channels of contact between SA's and international community; 
• the mission also bridged the gap in conceptual terms between social 
sciences and physical science; and 
• the mission did result in some funding for capacity building in certain 
universities and research institution. 
3.4 Environment and natural resource management 
It has generally been acknowledged that environmental concerns were an 
area neglected by the ANC during the 1980's. It was partly through the efforts 
of the IDRC that the issue was put on the table and then subsequently, 
debated during the constitutional negotiations. However, as missic;m member 
David Fig pointed out, the environment came up during the RDP discussions 
and 'various interests emerged around the greening of the RDP.' It was only 
at that stage that the ANC set up an environment desk headed by Tami 
Sokutu. Some questions still remain as to whether even then the ANC gave it 
sufficient priority given its first appointment. The new government's first 
environmental affairs and tourism minister Dawie de Villiers was' a National 
Party member. After 1994 it was one of the few departments not under control 
of the ANC despite the fact that its deputy minister Bantu Holomisa was from 
the ANC (but later broke away and formed his own party - the United 
Democratic Movement). 
Some informants claimed that the Minister wanted an arms length 
policymaking process around the drafting of new environmental policy. One 
informant said he was not sure whether government was ready for such a 
reform process (as proposed by the IDRC) and questioned whether they 
would have initiated such a process on their own. Ultimately, it would appear 
that the ANC (and government in the form of Holomisa) apparently 
approached the IDRC for assistance in ensuring that the policy process went 
ahead. The environmental mission got going towards the end of 1993 when a 
number of research papers were commissioned. The actual mission (which 
went around the country as part of a fact-finding mission) took place during 
1994. 
The mission took place against a history of the environment being viewed as 
a white middle class issue and was often synonymous with game parks and 
conservation. Little thought had gone into the relationship between the 
environment and sustainable development. The mission was tasked 'to 
identify policy priorities and to give recommendations to the new SA 
government on environmental policy, paying special attention to integrating 
environmental sustainability into the RDP.' The mission report was the key 
background document for a national consultative conference on national 
environmental policy held in August 1995. 
The key recommendations of the mission included: 
o government's plans for reconstruction and development would not be 
economically sustainable unless the environmental 'bottom line' was 
clearly written into economic and social policy. In order to achieve this, 
structures and processes in government and civil society would have to 
be strengthene;id. Within government, it would require greater co-
ordination between the environmental and economic clusters; 
o Various initiatives to strengthen environmental management including 
the setting up of advisory bodies at all levels of government to provide 
input from civil society to government on environmental policy and 
sustainable development issues; 
o Various recommendations on the management of various resources; 
and 
. o The setting up of the Consultative National Environment Policy Process 
to drive policy reform. 
Reflections 
It is undisputed that the mission acted as a catalyse for the subsequent reform 
process which led to the drafting of the National Environmental Management 
Act (Nema). Responses from informants clearly highlighted some of the 
IDRC's strengthens (many have been highlighted in the other three missions) 
which include: 
• A focus on a multi-stakeholder approach which ensured participation 
from a wide range of stakeholders in the formulation of environmental 
policy. This was critical for the environmental NGO's who were unable 
to autonomously organise these process. The IDRC played a role in 
bringing them into the process which gave them some kind of leverage 
in the policymaking process. 
• This process was important to ensure co-operation from the 'old guard' 
and business. All informants agreed that the multi-stakeholder 
approach was a critical intervention by the IDRC. In those early days of 
democracy the state welcomed such interventions. However, as the 
state has consolidated .itself, one informant said, it has moved away 
from this approach and the 'window' is now shut and policy making is 
done behind closed doors. 
• This all embracing consultative process was critical because of the 
dynamics which emerged around the fact that the department was 
viewed as 'National Party' territory. As such it came under enormous 
pressure and attacks from environmental activists. One informant said 
it appeared that the department was irritated by the mission,' they were 
vary of it and always found themselves under attack and under siege.' 
• This also appeared to be the first mission which included a 
representative from the SA Communist Party (SACP) which was 
contested by the IDRC as it was happy to work with the ANC and 
Cosatu but not the SACP. 
• The environmental policy process created a profile for a lot of people in 
civil society, NGO's and activists - some of whom landed up in senior 
government positions. A number of these people acknowledged the 
extent to which this process build their own capacity and refined their 
views on environmental issues. 'The process provided space to nurture 
ideas and became a melting pot for ideas on participatory approaches 
to the environment.' · 
• The IDRC had environmental experience in other developing countries 
as res4lt could make useful interventions and expose SA's to 
international expertise of the calibre of Anne Whyte. Therefore, it 
brought intellectual resources not just from the north but also the south; 
• , There was no attempt to push a Canadian agenda eventhough there 
was some opposition to the mission being headed up by a C~madian, in 
principle. One informant said the -underlying tension around this related 
to the ownership of the programme and who controlled the process -
was it an alliance programme with IDRC support or· an IDRC 
programme. The informant said Van Ameringen wanted his stamp on 
everything in the name of promoting the IDRC. · 
• The mission 'armed people with insight and knowledge and mobilised a 
whole lot of different constituencies.' Saliem Fakir (NGO representative 
on the mission) said the mission went out consciously to look for 
stakeholders to include in the policy process. 
As with numerous other interventions, the IDRC managed and facilitated the 
consultation process which led to the drafting of new environmental: policy. 
However, what is difficult to assess is the extent to which it influenced policy. 
Differing views exist some claimed that a lot of ideas raised in the mission 
report were carried forward into policy. Others believed that the various 
process embarked upon, especially the consultative process, all contributed 
towards the reframing of new policy and legislation. It is clear that the mission 
report did influence debates at that time (especially after a number of those 
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involved in the process ended up 'in government) but it is questionable 
whether it is shaping government thinking today. Barbara Schreiner, a 
member of the mission, questioned the extent to which the mission report has 
been disseminated and whether it has even been reviewed by the current 
leadership in the department. 
3.5 Supporting democracy: Governance programme 
The governance programme got underway in SA in 1993 following a request 
in 1992 by Mandela for assistance in preparing the democratic movement to 
govern. According to documentation and interviews, CIDA responded to this 
request and sent a mission to SA led by Dr Al. Johnson to determine the 
needs of the South Africans. The governance programme was subsequently 
described in IDRC documentation from a workshop held in April 1999 as 'an 
expression of the Canadian foreign policy goal of supporting democratic 
development'. 
At the outset the programme sought to devise an .'effective practitioner-based 
. strategy to assist SA's incoming government cadre to improve its capacity to 
govern once elected'. The IDRC, which by that stage had an office in the 
country, was chosen to administer the programme with CIDA funding which 
was expected to last until the end of 1999. Despite some pressure to continue 
with the programme in 2 000, the IDRC did not want while for CIDA it was an 
expensive project. Cl DA had also taken a decision to shift focus to look at 
poverty reduction and therefore, decided not to fund the project to the same 
magnitude. Rosemary Proctor said it was unfortunate that CIDA did not see 
the connection between sustaining democracy and ability to governance with 
initiatives to reduce poverty. If they had, they would have seen the value in 
continuing the programme. Following pressure from the Canadian provinces 
for CIDA to continue with the programme, it agreed to continue to support a 
small twinning project administered by IPAC. 
The governance programme, whilst having various elements to it, was 
extremely broad covering different periods from pre-1994 to 2000. Rosemary 
Proctor and Harvey Sims in an article 'The SA/Canada Program on 
Governance: an experiment in supporting democracy' argued why good 
governance was a necessary condition for sustained economic progress. 
They said:' governance is about the core laws, institutions and processes 
through which people make their fundamental choices and it is about the 
state's capacity to execute decisions, endorse laws, raise revenues, spend 
money efficiently and effectively, promote social stability, encourage public 
participation in representative institutions and the like .... lt follows that a 
governance program should aim at assisting people to establish the core 
institutions, key processes and skills that in turn will enable them to put into 
place the policies of their own choosing, within the framework of democracy.' 
The various elements of the programme which evolved over time included 
many if not all, of the aspects mentioned by Proctor and Sims: 
o In the period leading up to the 1994 elections, the programme 
focused mainly on assisting the democratic movement in the 
constitutional process (political negotiations). According to 
informants the programme assisted in providing critical advice 
around numerous complex issues related to the constitution. 
Assistance came in the form of study trips to Canada, workshops, 
seminars and 'think tanks' set up to assist in formulating positions, 
for example, around the transitional arrangements for the public 
• I service. 
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o Post 1994, the programme began to assist senior government 
officials (who had never worked in government) at both n'.ational and 
provincial level (with the focus more on the provinces) on their roles 
and responsibilities. The programme basically exposed largely 
black SA's into what it meant to function in the public service as 
public servants and not as politicians. During this period, the 
programme also began a twinning arrangement in 6 of the 9 
provinces. The programme focused extensively on training, 
capacity building and mentoring at a senior level. 
o The programme evolved and from about 1997 onwards its worked 
mainly on providing input to the Presidential Review Commission as 
well as assisting in refining systems around intergovernmental fiscal 
arrangements and other critical budgetary and financial 
administration elements. 
o The programme also facilitated the setting up of the SA 
Management and Development Institute (modelled on its 
counterpart in Canada) which was supposed to continue the work of 
the IDRC. This institute has failed to live up to its. Canadian 
counterpart. 
Reflections 
The majority of South Africans interviewed around this programme were all 
rather positive about what it was able to provide in terms of capacity building, 
mentorship, training and assistance in developing positions around the 
constitutional process. Where some concerns were raised were in relation to 
the fact that the programme ended way to early and the institution set up to 
take the process forward has not been that successful. This contrasts with the 
views of many within the IDRC who were uncomfortable with the programme 
from the start. It was never viewed as an 'IDRC project'; did not Min with the 
traditional work of the organisation and therefore, it was not able to add value 
to its implementation. As a result, a general sense of unease remains. One 
informant argued that the only reason the IDRC took on the project was so 
that ROSA would receive the administration fees. Whilst operating out of 
ROSA the programme acted almost independently of the IDRC. 
A key concern within some elements of the IDRC was the difficulty in 
accessing the impact of the programme as there was no establish baseline 
from which it could measure itself against. During a workshpp on the 
governance programme in 1999, it became clear why people in th~ IDRC felt 
the initial evaluation of the programme was problematic. The impact of the 
programme had to be measured and what better way than it~ effect on 
democracy. Proctor and Sims argued that the success of the programme 
could not be measured by 'whether or not democracy flourishes or founders' 
as the programme was far too small in terms of its impact on overall 
democracy in SA. 
Whilst debate continues as to the best way for monitoring and evaluating 
programmes, a former CIDA representative involved in aspects of the· 
programme questioned its contribution to transformation. He argued that the 
programme turned its beneficiaries into bureaucrats but 'did the programme 
ensure that public servants understood that they had a different role to play in 
transition, especially where a government has committed itself to a 
transformation agenda?' This view was supported by the fact that the 
governance programme team did not include a development specialist or 
someone who could integrate lessons learnt from countries in transition. 
Interviews with various South Africans who benefited from the programme 
revealed the following: 
• At a very critical point the IDRC provided cutting edge support that 
made a difference to the constitutional process. Ivor Jenkins of IDASA 
said he had been involved in various projects with Johnson. One of the 
most significant had been a trip to Canada with 28 constitutional 
negotiators and writers to look at their constitution and constitutional 
related matters and issues around provincialism and provincial 
government and fiscal matters in 1994. 'The impact of that trip on 
people's thinking was significant', he said. 
• The IDRC was viewed in a positive light as it was seen to combine 
experience . with knowledge. This was merely reinforced by the high 
profile people it had heading· up the governance programme. 
• An informant who worked closely with Proctor said her input was 
invaluable especially as a new director general coming into 
government who had never been in government before. 
• Beneficiaries of the programme saw the IDRC as being 'responsive to 
our needs' and were extremely good at leveraging expertise and 
granting SA's access to many people in provincial and national 
government in Canada or any other expertise required. 
· • Those involved in the constitutional process said Johnson was 
invaluable in assisting in the drafting of the provisions in the 
constitution around the future of the public service and transitional 
measures around the public service for the constitution and political 
negotiations. 
• One informant said 'everyone wanted to be a politician but after training 
people began to understand the differences between being a politician 
and a public servant.' 
• Some concern around the programme was expressed in relation to co-
ordination with other IDRC programmes underway. 
• A further problem related to the fact that a number of different donors 
were involved with the governance and related programmes 'which 
ensured that everyone was pulling in different directions as all the 
donors had different interests and competing for different pieces of the 
action.' 
·In view of the upcoming elections in SA, it was rather difficult to access some 
ministers including Zola Skweyiya, the former minister for public service and 
administration who could have provided a sense of the impact of the 
programme at a national level. Various interviews did however, revealed how 
some provinces benefited. Outgoing Northern Cape premier Manne Dipico 
was extremely positive about the contributions of the programme tqwards 
stability in his province. He added that the IDRC through its funding initiatives 
contributed enormously to the development of democracy and the 
strengthening of the democratic structures found after the 1994-
breakthrough.' 
Dipico said in order to appreciate the effectiveness of the governance 
programmes, 'we have to cite the example of the early conceptualization of 
provinces and premiers as a direct outcome of that process. Many of the ANC 
premier-elects travelled to Canada to interact and learn lessons around the 
workings of provincial governments within the system of co-operative 
governance in a unitary country. Some very important features of our 
provincial system of governance were drawn from the Canadian-example of 
provinces, though there are many areas of difference also. The next level of 
governance strengthening was the areas of policy and coordination within the 
highest office of the province - premier's office. In the case of the Northern 
Cape, we further developed the experience of Canada by learning the 
integrated model of government service delivery. The concept of one-stop 
service delivery, was organized to suite the conditions of the provin~e and 
proved a model of integrated service in a province with vast areas and large 
distances, complicated by low levels of infrastructure. We established site of 
integrated service delivery in some of the regions of the province, which bring 
together major government services such as national departments and 
provincial departments services at a point of service.' 
As mentioned previously, it has been difficult to get a sense of the impact of 
the governance programme at a national government level. Proctor said one 
of the weaknesses of the intervention was that there was no champion for the 
overall programme at a national level (in terms of national government 
departments). To some degree that might have been the case initially when 
Skweyiya was involved but he did not stay connected with the programme as 
he became minister in another department. Proctor said there was also no 
champion for the programme in the president's office. As a result the focus 
was more on the provinces than at a national level because it did not have a 
sustained strong national champion. 
3.6 Information and Communication Policies and Technologies 
As Jay Naidoo (former general secretary of Cosatu and forme~ post and 
telecommunications minister) said the importance of ICT's in development 
was acknowledged and recognised within the democratic movement way 
before the IDRC got involved in SA 'We recognised the imp'ortance of 
t~chnology from the late 1980's when Cosatu was engaged in a technology 
project.' This issue was included in the RDP which formed part ofithe ANC's 
first election manifesto. The previous government made some moves to 
restructure the telecommunications industry but it failed to address certain 
fundamental principles which the new ANC government sought to achieve 
such as universal access. There was an acknowledgement of the need to 
develop a more coherent strategy to achieve these objectives· as well as 
develop an approach to incorporate the new government's privatisation plans 
for Telkom, the national operator. 
The IDRC embarked on a number of missions to SA from 1993 onwards to 
determine the countries needs in terms of reforming the information and 
telecommunications sector. One of the key recommendations of a mission in 
1994 was the decision to develop a National Information and Communication 
Programme (NICP). A key function of NICP was to advice and facilitated the 
formulation of an information and telecommunications policy framework which 
occurred through the National Telecommunications Forum. Support for this 
process then led to the IDRC being involved in assisting in developing the 
green and white papers for a national telecommunications policy. 
The IDRC through funding provided by CIDA engaged in a number of 
initiatives around ICT's in SA A full .account of its activities and impact on 
policy was conducted in 2003. The IDRC assisted in a range of areas such as 
managing a national information and communications project, providing 
advice and technical support to government so as to use ICT as a tool for 
so,cio-economic development, community access projects, involvement in the 
development of a new telecommunications policy and the setting up of Acacia. 
Reflections 
As with the various other missions embarked upon, the IDRC ensured the 
following: 
• A multi-stakeholder approach in the formulation of policy. The IDRC 
helped to facilitate rather than impose a pre-packaged solution. Willy 
Curry, involved in the telecommunications policy process, said the 
multi-stakeholder forum provided an important policy space for all the 
different competing interests. 
• The IDRC provided a site under the control of the new minister from 
which to launch a new process around telecommunications reform. 
• Whilst internal knowledge existed, the IDRC provided access to a 
range of policy experts in both developing and developed economies. 
• All informants agreed that the IDRC's role or 'success' was its ability to 
facilitate processes rather than influencing positions. I DRC consultant 
Kate Wild said SA had good knowledgeable people driving the process 
who knew what they wanted and they did not need hard technical input 
from the IDRC. This view was reinforced by another Canadian who 
argued that the IDRC was probably important in terms of forming 
relations and networks 'but once things got going' it was questionable 
whether the organisation was important. 
• Aside from playing a supportive role in the policy process, the IDRC 
was viewed as a broker and neutral in bringing competing parties 
together. 
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• It appeared that in the early days IDRC funded research did impact on 
government thinking, especially in relation to universal access. 
• The telecommunications process clearly reflects the type of role the 
IDRC played. It influenced the quality of the policymaking process but 
final legislative decisions were government's prerogative and subject to 
political dynamics at the time. 
• Some concern was expressed that if time had permitted initial research 
so pulling together the global dynamics and domestic situation would 
have been useful. 
• The IDRC's biggest influence on the policy process, Curry said, was its 
efforts to empower a lot of people in communities to get involved in the 
ICT sector. Some of these initiatives were successful and others might 
have been overambitious 
• The Acacia Initiative, approved in 1997, sought to develop programmes 
in Africa which captured the benefits of technology. Various tensions 
existed around Ottawa's commitment to Acacia, some informants 
claimed. Its effectiveness was not only hampered by a range of factors 
including those appointed to manage Acacia. Under the Acacia 
umbrella the Schoolnet SA project was endorsed and supported with 
the aim of promoting the use of ICT's in schools. This project like TIPS 
was initially housed in the IDRC offices but later was hived off as a 
separate organisation. In recent years Schoolnet SA has faced 
management and financial problems and has lost its focus. 
• The IDRC provided advice on setting up of the Universal Service 
Agency (USA). In hindsight this model proved to be rather ambitious. 
The aim of USA was to provide community access through a universal 
service fund. Naidoo said whilst it was an overambitious initiative from 
all sides, its failure was largely a result of SA being unable to 
implement the model properly. The ICT process, he said, was an 
important learning experience with some aspects succeeding and 
others not. A SA informant felt that the process was fraught as it 
appeared to idealistic and did not bring the 'right' people into the 
process. · 
• As with other'missions, a number of people who were involved landed 
up in senior positions either in the various regulators who other 
government linked structures. 
4. IDRC's contribution to transformation 
An analysis of the IDRC's main missions and interventions in SAduring the_ 
transition period reveals that its key contributions have related to: (1) 
facilitating more transparent and democratic policymaking pr9cess; (2) 
strengthening the capacity of researchers to undertake research which would 
feed into policy processes; (3) harnessing research as an input to policy 
decisions; (4) laying the groundwork for transformation by getting involved in 
critical projects. ~ 
Facilitating more transparent and democratic policy processes 
There is a general consensus amongst South Africans that one of the IDRC's 
most important role in the policy making process was its ability to facilitate 
'good processes'. One informant said 'Van Ameringen's strength was his 
ability to network, build alliances and draw in a diverse group of people.' 
Another said: 'Van Ameringen played a critical role in bringing people together 
and provided a platform for different groupings of people to debate issues and 
distil ideas.' The IDRC, in the majority of interventions, stressed the need for 
multi-stakeholder involvement and through their efforts created such platforms. 
The IDRC was able to fulfil this role partly due to the personality of Van 
Ameringen but also as a result of the fact that South Africans felt comfortable 
with Canadians. A number of informants said they did not feel that the 
Canadians were ideologically bound, did not appear to have an overt political 
agenda which they tried to impose or come with a prescriptive solution from 
the International Monetary Fund or World Bank. They were prepared to listen 
to what we wanted and recognised that people on the ground had expertise.' 
Strengthening the capacity of researchers to undertake research which would 
feed into policy processes 
An important part of the IDRC's traditional work has been to support and build 
capacity amongst researchers in developing economies. This was a key 
objective underlying all its interventions in SA In some instances the IDRC's 
support did assist in building capacity amongst researchers whilst effort was 
made to develop black economists and researchers. Aside from personal 
comments from IDRC beneficiaries, clear signs exist today that, to some 
degree, the IDRC did facilitate the building of research capacity. This is 
evident by the fact that many involved in IDRC missions or research initiatives 
either landed up in senior positions in government, NGO's or became high-
paying consultants. 
Comments made by SA informants revealed that many IDRC beneficiaries 
(those researchers who received support) were 'relatively young and junior 
researchers who were thrust into spotlight as a result of their involvement in 
IDRC sponsored processes.' An informant who had. been involved in the ISP 
said: 'some of us were novices and had never done things like this (ISP)' but 
their involvement turned out to be helpful. Beneficiaries claimed that IDRC 
support ensured that they were freed up just to do research without having to 
worry about fulfilling other obligations. 'By making resources available to do 
research the IDRC created space for people to think. It was a valuable input. 
If space and research capacity had not been created then it would have led to 
more shallow research and debate.' 
A general weakness of all the missions was the failure to ensure the 
development of black economists and researchers, as anticipated. Whilst this 
did take place, it was not too the extent envisaged. There are numerous· 
reasons why this occurred. Part of it could be a consequence of the fact that 
there was pressure to deliver on policy and capacity building became a 
secondary objective. A more cynical view, expressed by one informant, was 
j 
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that some white economists/academics were not as committed to this agenda 
as opposed to forwarding their own agendas. 
Harnessing research as an input to policy decisions 
Naidoo said 'we must not overestimate the contribution of ir;iternational 
agencies in policy formulation in SA. The IDRC understood our challenges, 
goals and helped facilitate these.' How then has the IDRC's i'ntervention 
impacted on policy decisions? What effect has I DRC supported research had 
on policy and policymaking? 
It is understood that within the IDRC the relationship between research and 
policy has become more of a priority than it used to be. In the SA case, it was 
clear that at times, identifying that linkage was difficult as influencing policy 
can be more nuanced than a direct relationship between research and policy. 
As one informant said: 'The early 1990's was an intense period of policy 
development. We had the time and high level of intellectual capacity to focus 
on policy. In some respects the IDRC facilitated thinking and work which 
translated into policy', one informant said. 
As it is generally understood, research is a necessary input for any 
policymaking process. However, research on its own does not normally get 
transferred one to one into policy. Research can promote certain ideas and 
enrich debates but ultimately, it is that process between research and the 
adoption of a policy which determines a final position. That process is about 
politics. It is about making compromises either to accommodate differing 
vested interests or to comply with the politics of the day. 
It is clear that in a number of interventions where the IDRC supported 
research and the policymaking process, that other factors played a role in the 
final policies adopted. In some instances, policies eventually adopted were 
the result of behind the scenes political deals. Does this then imply that policy 
relevance does not automatically mean that one is close to a policy process? 
Impacting on policy could occur indirectly. As Cassim had argued in a recent 
paper: 'The complexity of developing methodologies to provide indicators on 
the impact of research on policy is compounded by the all encompassing 
nature of the subject. For example, attempting to develop an approach that 
assesses the right political and institutional environment wherein policy 
relevant research could thrive is significantly different to assessing whether 
particular kinds of research have the potential to make an impact on policy, 
assuming that the environment is conducive to it.' 
The IDRC, in a number of cases, funded both research and supported 
policymaking processes. Does this then mean that the organisation had 
'influence' over policymaking? Influence is a rather loaded term and implies 
that the IDRC was able to sway the government one way or another or had 
the power to do so. Whilst the IDRC might not have been able td exert that 
type of 'influence' over the final policy option (as that would impl~ it has the 
final say), it has played an 'influential' role. That is by virtue of its support, 
funding and facilitation of policy relevant research and exposing poqcy makers, 
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researchers and academics to different international experts who promote · 
different policy options. 
Having said all this, there were instances, where key research 
recommendations did filter through into final policies adopted by the new 
government. Ultimately, the IDRC did not have the type of influence which 
could determine government's final position on the future of Telkom, for 
example. But what the IDRC was able to do was support, facilitate and assist 
the ANC (and once in power the new government) to think through various 
policy options and create a platform for broader debate. In that sense, it 
contributed towards a 'good' policymaking process. An informant said 'during 
policymaking processes there is an inevitable but gradual shifting of views as 
people face the reality of practical implementation. It forces people to be less 
ideological.' 
Laying the groundwork for transformation by getting involved in critical 
projects 
By responding to the needs and demands of the ANC, the IDRC got involved 
in important initiatives which helped shape the countries transition. By 
responding to the ANC's needs and demands, the IDRC in SA did not always· 
land up operating within the parameters of the organisations traditional work. 
In some instances this was overlooked but a number of comments made by 
Canadians revealed concerns around this. This raises some important issues 
for the IDRC in the event it does work in other countries in transition (see 
below). 
In the majority of instances, the IDRC did not impose an agenda on those 
driving transformation. However, it did emphasise some areas which might 
have been neglected by the ANC such as issues around the environment and 
science and technology. A number of SA's said the IDRC 'helped us to figure 
it out and find our own solutions. The IDRC did not claim to know the solutions 
for people in developing countries.' Other comments revealed that the IDRC 
was more flexible than other donor agencies and was 'open to new ideas and 
experimentation'. 
5. IDRC's positioning in SA 
In an unusual move, the IDRC took a decision to fund research and other 
initiatives for and on behalf of a political party - the ANC (in exile) and its 
various allies inside SA during the height of apartheid government rule. This 
move laid the basis for an ongoing working relationship between the IDRC 
and those who formed part of the broader democratic movement. Building oh 
that earlier relationship the IDRC, as one informant said, became the 'darling 
of the ANC'. The IDRC received the go ahead from the ANC in Lusaka to 
begin to fund anti-apartheid research. This eventually evolved into research 
aimed at providing input to policymaking processes as the ANC began to 
prepare itself to govern. 
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As a result·the IDRC became involved in facilitating processes around the 
development of key policies for a post-apartheid SA One informant said the 
IDRC came into the country at a time when there were not so many other 
donor organisations around. The informant said: 'they were one of the first 
"kids on the block" and as a result build up a track record.' IDRC 
representative Wardle Lipan said it was about being in SA during the bad 
times to help bring about the end of apartheid. Another informa~t said that 
whilst the IDRC might have been well-placed to become involved in these 
critical processes, ultimately, it was responding to a demand not only from the 
ANC but from Mandela which was endorsed by the Canadian government. 
The ANC and the broader liberation movement were seeking assistance in 
developing a vision for the new SA and the pressure was on to develop clear 
policy positions as it became apparent that a negotiated settlement was 
imminent. The government in waiting and the new government post 1994 (for 
a short period of time) was receptive to new ideas/research and input from so-
called intellectuals. 'The IDRC was in the right place at the right time', one 
informant said. As a result IDRC officials from Canada saw their colleagues in 
SA as enjoying unprecedented access to key decision makers in SA under 
the new government. Access to those in government came about·partly as a 
result of the fact that a large number of people who were beneficiaries of the 
IDRC landed up in senior positions in government including ministerial level. 
The IDRC assisted in harnessing the intellectual capital by accessing the 
'right' intellectuals and researchers who themselves were aligned to 'people in 
right places' or those individuals who eventually became the change agents in 
the new SA Once having positioned itself in the late 1980's and early 1990's, 
the IDRC was able to maintain its profile by: 
• Having a physical presence in the country in the form of an office was 
important as it ensured that the organisation could establish and retain 
close personal contacts. It also reflects some sense of commitment to 
the country and the processes it was involved in at the time. Having an 
office and personnel in the country meant that the IDRC was able to 
respond quickly to requests especially in such a period when 
everything was urgent because of the political negotiations.: The office 
could have its finger on the pulse of what was happening and the 
needs of tlie stakeholders. 
• There was a general acknowledgment at the time that the IDRC was 
known for being prepared to act fast which was a change from some of 
the other more bureaucratic institutions and structures. Thi~ however, 
changed in the latter years. 
• The IDRC in SA was headed up by a person who und~rstood the 
politics of the day; knew what was required and was abl:e to make 
things happen. One informant said some people believed it was not so 
much about IDRC in Ottawa but about the way Van ~meringen 
operated which ensured the organisations profile. 'He wanted to claim 
ownership of processes so as to ensure the IDRC stamp wa~ on it.' 
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At the end of the day, the IDRC's position in the country was dependent on 
whether its services were in demand or not. In the early years, the focus was 
. on policy relevant research. Hence the I DR C's main impact was in the early 
years leading up to about 1996/7. The IDRC's approach was viewed to be 
naval and strategic. Aside from that the organisation provided South Africans 
with instant access to a 'body of knowledge and practice' through the IDRC 
global network. Many informants said that the IDRC could not be compared to 
other traditional funders not only because it listened to the needs rather than 
try to push solutions but because it brought something other than financial 
resources. 
By the time the new government introduced what was viewed as a rather 
controversial macro-economic strategy in the form of the Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution Strategy (Gear), the environment had changed and 
government was no longer focused on developing policies but on 
implementation. The unique window of opportunity in which the IDRC could 
build its profile through funding research and other initiatives which sought to 
lay the foundation for debate on key policies was no long available. The time 
had pasted, as one informant said, when 'there was a young, new and 
inexperienced government who was open to new ideas and the input of 
intellectuals and academics.' 
6. Can the SA case be replicated? 
There are limits on the ability to replicate models (as opposed to concepts) as 
. was evident even in some of the projects introduced by the IDRC in SA. An 
example, was the establishment of Niep which was supposed to have been 
modelled on the rather successful AECR or the SA Manageme·nt and 
Development Institute. In both cases various environmental factors hampered 
their development and effectiveness. 
A similar result could occur if an attempt is made to replicate what happened 
in SA in another transitional developing country unless the prevailing 
conditions were identical. As one informant said 'people were open to 
consultation and this created the environment for creative input. People felt 
they were starting over so they did not feel constricted or constrained to think 
out of the box. What better breeding ground for programme development.' It 
is .generally accepted that a country in transition is usually more likely to be 
receptive to research in addressing policy solutions. Whilst that might be the 
case, one has to ensure that the right policy environment exists. The IDRC 
found fertile ground for its 'product' not only because the environment was 
ripe for an exchange of ideas (the new government open to new thinking and 
prepared to challenge existing thinking) but a range of other factors were in 
place such as: 
• A supply of researchers and presence of local knowledge. This was 
certainly the case in SA where there was an established research 
community while there was also broad depth of knowledge. 'SA was in 
a unique position as it had strong intellectual basis and a strong civil· 
society movement, it was not just a blank sheet.' 
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• A reasonably well established civil society. In SA (as compared to the 
rest of Africa) the various organs of civil society were extremely 
powerful during the 1980's and 1990's. This is importa:nt if multi-
stakeholder processes are to take place as part of the overall 
policymaking process; ' 
• The researchers and academics had strong ties with the em1erging new 
power brokers and in some cases they became part of the n'ew political 
elite. The relationship between intellectuals and governments is an 
important one. SA has a history of such alliances (intellectuals went 
into the government of the day in both 1904 and in 1948) but it is 
questionable to what extent this happens in other developing countries; 
• Each situation is unique and in the SA case it was clear from the mid to 
late 1980's that there would be a decisive victory of one party winning 
which meant that the IDRC could focus its attention on the ANC. The 
situation might not always be as clear-cut in other transition processes. 
• The space and time existed to explore various policy options and 
conduct policy relevant research in the lead up to the political 
negotiations. Other transition countries might not have the kind of time 
that SA had and even then time pressures became an iss~e in some 
processes. 
• Aside from the prevailing conditions in the country, a lot al~o depends 
on personalities. In this case it relates to the role of the person (and 
type of person) heading up the IDRC on the ground. One informant 
said 'the role of an individual can defy all the rules.' Another said 'you 
can have all things right but you cannot underestimate the personal 
relationships in situations such as this.' The general view from the SA 
informants was that such a function cannot be left to a 'bureaucratic 
type'. A person operating in a country in transition needs to fully 
understand (and have a sense of) the political dynamics; be able to 
identify the potential power brokers or new political elite; network 
effectively; facilitate process and be perceived to be neutral. : 
Ultimately, SA became the flavour of the month and the IDRC decided to try 
something different. It is clear that the organisation feels comfortable with 
some of the interventions made and not with others. What is however, critical 
here is that if an organisation such as the IDRC wishes to involve itself in 
countries in transition they might be required to adopt 'a different way of 
working'. The question is to what extent this 'deviation' of IDRC approach has 
influenced other initiatives embarked upon since its involvement in SA? 
Depending on the response should we not then be talking about replicating a 
concept rather than a model? 
7. Lessons from South Africa 
IDRC's involvement in SA seems to have raised some rather 'interesting 
challenges for the organisation not only in terms of future plans· to involve 
itself in other countries in transition but more broadly, in terms: of how it 
currently operates. I 
The SA experience has revealed the following: 
~ The IDRC played a supportive role in critical processes which shaped 
transformation. They were able to participate in such processes 
because the IDRC was prepared to listen to what the SA's wanted and 
responded to demands where they were able to. 
~ If the overall objective is to have an impact on policy then it is critical to 
have a proper understanding of the full policy cycle as in research, 
design and implementation. There is a sense that in a number of IDRC 
supported processes insufficient attention was given to the challenges 
around implementation and the capacity to implement various policy 
options, some of which were rather sophisticated. 
~ The IDRC's traditional approach of strengthening capacity outside 
government so as to ensure there is engagement in critical 
independent analysis was at times compromised. What has not been 
explored is whether this would have the potential of weakening civil 
society. Some concerns were raised that the potential existed to 
weaken civil society if all the resources were focused on government 
and not elsewhere. This was largely due to the fact that as the ANC 
moved into government so to did the IDRC assistance. This however, 
only occurred for a short period after 1994. 
~ It is clear that part of the I DRC's success in SA was its ability to 
carefully identify who the emergent leaders were going to be and to 
work with them. Funders can spent an enormous amount of time and 
energy but 'if your product is not taken up by policy makers' then 
resources are wasted. 
~ Establishing legitimacy and building trust is critical otherwise access is 
limited or denied. 
~ Involvement in countries in transition, as was evident in SA, might 
require a more flexible approach to the way in which the IDRC 
operates. 'You have to fit your instruments to meet the needs and 
circumstances.' It became clear with ROSA that the very qualities 
which made it a successful operation in the early years then turned into 
liabilities as the tide turned in Ottawa. Some sort of balance needs to 
be explored between creating space for creativity and ensuring proper 
controls are in place. 
~ One of the IDRC's strengths was promoting more democratic and 
transparent policymaking processes. Some concern was raised 
however, as to whether the organisation got too involved in trying to 
determine final policy options. This is backed up by comments by some 
individuals who felt the IDRC was more concerned about the end 
product than about focusing on the process and ensuring capacity 
building and the building of a strong civil society to hold government 
accountable. 
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~ The SA experienced showed the need to respect lo_cal knowledge and 
structures. 
Finally, the decision to support the ANC in exile whilst the apartheid state was 
still in place reflected an organisation which was prepared to i chart new 
territory and which has dared to make mistakes, as one informant said. By 
adopting, what might then have been viewed as 'taking a path r;io-one has · 
gone before', the IDRC indicated its willingness to take risks, or is it.? 
8. Organisational issues 
Whilst the closure of the Johannesburg did not form part of the overall terms 
of reference of this report, it was raised in the majority of interviews without 
any prompting from the writer. Hence, it would be unrealistic not to make 
some mention of it as it obviously still remains a sensitive issue. Before 
discussing this issue further, the report looks at how the IDRC's profile in SA 
assisted the Canadian government and perceptions of ROSA. 
8. 1 Did IDRC's profile in SA assist Canada? 
I 
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There was a general acknowledgement from the majority of .Canadians 
interviewed (especially those who had worked for Cl DA) that the presence of 
IDRC in SA assisted the ·Canadian government in establishing good 
relationship with the new SA government post 1994. Prior to the first 
democratic elections in 1994 the Canadian government did not have official 
business with the SA government. As the Canadian government began to 
develop new relations with the government post 1994, it could do so based on 
the fact that it had a Canadian organisation already in the country which had 
established good relations with key people in government. A former CIDA 
representative Steve Hallihan said: 'it was made clear to me that the IDRC 
approach in SA had been really strategic'. They had been able to establish 
strong connections in the new government and amongst the key change 
agents. The IDRC, he said, provided the natural bridge and door into SA for 
the Canadian government. Hallihan said the SA office (and Van Ameringen) 
did not only do a good job for the IDRC but provided good advantages for the 
Canadian government in building relations with the new government. 
8.2 Perceptions of the IDRC operation in SA 
Whilst the IDRC office in Johannesburg (or otherwise known as ROSA) 
gained a high-profile both in SA and in Canada for the work it did in SA, there 
are clear indications from those interviewed in Ottawa that there was 
discomfort in the way in which the office operated. What will not. be explored 
here is whether this discomfort was legitimate or based on what some would 
argue 'narrow and small minded vested interests' and 'petty jealousy'. 
The types of views which did emerge, mainly from Ottawa, included~ 
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• Perception that ROSA was operating outside the boundaries of the 
IDRC firstly, because a number of its programming were not 
mainstream IDRC programmes and secondly, the office was operating 
as an IDRC within the IDRC. One informant said the perception was 
that it had become its own NGO and was no longer under control of 
Ottawa. He cautioned to add that it was not so much a question of 
head-office control but being part of a larger institution ; 
• There was a disproportionate focus on revenue generation which was 
actually in line with the overall focus of the IDRC as a whole at the time. 
As a result of an overemphasis on revenue generation, there was a 
view that projects were often chosen for that reason. The. flip side of 
that was that through the co-funding of projects, the IDRC appeared to 
haye a much larger impact with relative small investments; 
• There was a lack of clarity as to how programmes were chosen and 
whether an overall strategy existed or were decisions based on 
opportunism; 
• The office was viewed as an operation which did dynamic things and 
was not prepared to always operate within the rules of the game. 
• A number of SA informants complained about the poor administration 
and seemingly lack of financial controls in the office 
• The SA's were happy that in the early years they did not have to put up 
with much bureaucracy which slowed down responses to requests at a 
time when time was of the essence. 
• People in Ottawa felt that Van Ameringen was given too much lee-way 
in how he operated whilst staff in SA felt that there was an attempt by 
Ottawa to micro-manage the SA operation. 
• Differences of opinion existed over the type of research being 
conducted in SA. Some people in Ottawa argued that some of the 
research being embarked upon as part of the policymaking processes 
did not constitute proper research. 
8.3 Office closure 
For many of the Canadians who were either based at ROSA or had close 
relations with SA, the closure of ROSA still remains a sensitive issue. The 
majority interviewed were opposed to the closure; a minority believed the 
work of the IDRC had come to an end and hence the life of the office; others 
felt that the operation could have been trimmed down and restructured while 
those opposed to the closure believed SA remained a good base to if the 
intention was to focus on Africa. (This argument might be even more relevant 
if SA is chosen to house the parliament for the African Union. That is aside 
from the fact that NEPAD is being driven from SA) Various political 
sensitivities - whether narve or not - prevented such a decision from being 
taken. One Canadian said the office had stayed open to long its closure was a 
'storm in a tea-cup'. 
The majority of South Africans were rather perplexed as to the underlying 
reasons for the closure. There was a sense amongst many, that there was 
more to the closure than the official version. A number of SA's felt that the 
:1' •. l' I;],.,,_ 
~ ,_ .. --~ 
way in which the IDRC closed ROSA did a lot to undermine all that the 
organisation did over the years. Lael Bethlehem said 'funders try for decades 
to build up the sort of access and reputation that the IDRC developed. The 
organisation spent years building something valuable and overnight they 
closed it down.' 1 
Despite opposition to the closure a number of SA's did however, feel that the 
work of the IDRC had been done and many of its beneficiaries had moved on. 
One SA informant said: 'rriany people had moved on by the time the office 
closed. One of the consequences of transition is that many of the people who 
benefited from the IDRC in the past had far less need for the organisation as 
they were no longer doing research anymore.' 
From about 1997 onwards it appeared as if some projects began to lose 
momentum and there was a sense that the organisation was starting to lose 
its edge. By this time, the IDRC was no longer the only donor agency around 
and the terrain had changed even to the extent that the new government had 
become closer to other donor agencies. In addition, a number of ROSA staff 
were being poached by government and other organisations. 
There could well be a case to argue that if the closure of ROSA had been 
more transparent and political tensions had not existed, the reaction might not 
have been what it was (and remains). This might be a rather narve 
assessment but leaving it as is, the closure of the office has important 
implications for the IDRC in the event it decides to open up satellite offices in 
countries in which they plan to work aside from existing regional offices. 
Some important issues to consider in light of the ROSA experience: 
• From the outset there needs to be clarity as to the status of the office, 
its lifespan and how it should function. Here however, caution should 
be exercised in trying to ensure accountability to Ottawa at the 
expense of being responsive and proactive; 
• There also needs to be a proper exit strategy; 
• In order to ensure high levels of flexibility different types 'of staffing 
arrangements can be embarked upon, for example, short duration 
contracts or employment contracts linked to specific projects.: 
What remains unanswered is whether the IDRC's credibility was ~ffected by 
the manner in which the office was closed. Did it threw away its political 
capital, as a former IDRC representative claimed? For many of those South 
Africans who were involved with the IDRC from the 1980's onwards, they no 
longer think that the organisation has a presence in SA. Perhaps that is not an 
issue if the work the IDRC set out to do in country has been done. 
Annexure A-C (to follow) 
